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1 Introduction
Across low and middle income countries (LMICs), the prices of essential medicines, such as cancer
treatments, HIV antiretrovirals, and antibiotics, display substantial variations, with the locally
observed prices sometimes being many times higher than the lowest international reference level.
For example, among a group of nine common molecules purchased by the countries included in
our analysis, the observed mean price across countries varies by a factor of 16.1 Even within
countries, the data show variations of up to 300 percent across procurement channels. High
prices, in turn, deplete already limited public health budgets and generate shortfalls in access,
especially for the poorest and neediest part of the population.
Understanding these price variations and formulating policy recommendations for better and
cheaper access to drugs in developing countries requires analyzing the market structure for drug
procurement. It is likely that buyer fragmentation on the demand side – in particular, whether
public procurement is centralized or not – and suppliers’ degree of market power both matter in
explaining the final prices of drugs.
In this paper, we analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the impact of procurement
mechanisms and supply-side concentration on drug purchase prices in LMICs. LMICs use a
variety of procurement mechanisms: centralized public procurement with or without central
medical stores, decentralized public procurement, and private procurement. Across countries and
therapeutic areas, the concentration of suppliers varies enormously, from single seller situations
to highly competitive environments.
We first develop a model in which several firms offer differentiated products through a pro-
curement process that can be either centralized or decentralized. We assume that public buyers
are price-takers when buying in a decentralized manner, an appropriate assumption in the context
of LMICs, but become non-price-takers when procurement is centralized. Under fairly general
assumptions, we show that in a duopoly setting, prices under centralized procurement are lower
than prices under decentralized procurement. This result also extends to an oligopoly setting
with an arbitrary number of firms.
We then use data from seven LMICs with diverse drug procurement systems to evaluate empir-
ically which procurement mechanisms allow countries to access drugs at lower prices. Specifically,
we use data from IMS Health (IQVIA) that exhaustively cover the sales quantities and expendi-
tures of drugs for forty molecules at a finely disaggregated level by year and sector of purchase
during the period 2015-2017. The countries included in the analysis are India (the State of Ker-
1See Section 4 for details.
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ala), the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa (a subset of three States: KwaZulu-Natal,
North West and Eastern Cape), Tunisia, and Zambia.
Consistent with the model’s predictions, our main finding is that centralized procurement of
drugs allows the public sector to obtain much lower prices. However, we also find that the price
reduction is smaller when the supply side is more concentrated. At the extreme, instrumenting
the supply side concentration, we show that the price difference vanishes when public buyers face
a monopolistic supplier. These results are obtained by exploiting variation across molecules and
products, within country-year and within therapeutic area-year observations. Indeed, for three
of the countries in our sample (the Philippines, Serbia, and South Africa), the channels of drug
procurement vary within specific therapeutic areas, for example, with specific HIV antiretrovirals
being purchased centrally and other drugs being purchased in a decentralized manner. Finally,
we show that the price difference in favor of public centralized mechanisms does not arise from
higher demand elasticity in the public sector.
The economic literature addressing the issue of affordable access to drugs in developing coun-
tries has mostly considered the pricing question from a patent protection angle (e.g., Chaudhuri
et al. (2006); Kyle and Qian (2014)). There, the trade-off appears to be between the potential
costs of restrictive patent policies due to the implied pricing policies, the main one being the
exclusion of a large number of poor and uninsured patients, and the potential benefits related
to the increased and faster diffusion of drugs to previously excluded markets (Cockburn et al.
(2016)).
Those contributions, however, have not addressed other important potential sources of fric-
tion in local drug markets, such as suppliers’ market power and buyers’ size, and the type of
procurement mechanisms used by public buyers. These frictions are likely to matter, especially
for the large set of off-patent drugs. For molecules for which generics are available, the market
structure and purchasing mechanisms are likely to be paramount in determining local prices.
One mechanism that has been used to attempt to reduce unit purchase prices is pooled
procurement, whereby several buyers, either institutions in a single country or health agencies
across countries, consolidate their purchases.2
The existing theoretical literature on the impact of pooled procurement on prices shows that,
theoretically, prices can be either positively or negatively affected by the formation of a buyer
group. For instance, in a setting with a single supplier, Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and
Wey (2007) find that a buyer group leads to lower prices (for the group members) if the supplier’s
2Pooled procurement channels may vary and include the joint acquisition of large quantities at a given time
and the negotiation of contracts allowing for the supply of drugs over long periods.
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cost is convex, while it leads to higher prices if cost is concave.3 Jeon and Menicucci (2019) also
find that the shape of suppliers’ cost functions affects the impact of pooled procurement on prices
in a model that extends the common agency setup (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) to multiple
suppliers. However, in contrast to earlier papers, they find that a buyer group has no effect on
prices when cost is concave. They further show that when cost is convex, the effect on prices can
be either positive or negative, depending on which equilibrium is selected.4
Inderst and Montez (2019) uncover a new mechanism for why a buyer group may not always
lead to lower prices. They consider a setting where multiple suppliers and buyers engage in
bilateral bargaining, and prices are determined by buyers’ ability to relocate purchases across
suppliers and suppliers’ ability to relocate sales across buyers (in case of a bilateral disagreement).
In their model, an increase in the size of a buyer (due to the formation of a buyer group) increases
the mutual dependency between that buyer and the suppliers by worsening their options to adjust
trade in case of a disagreement. This change generates both positive and negative effects on prices
and leads to an ambiguous prediction regarding the net impact of a buyer group on prices.
In practice, pooled drug procurement mechanisms have been implemented in the Eastern
Caribbean Drug Service (ECDS) established in the late 1980s, which groups nine small island
nations (see Huff-Rousselle and Burnett (1996)), the Gulf Cooperation Council group-purchasing
program (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE), and the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO) Strategic Fund, which groups seventeen countries for the purchase of vac-
cines. Similar arrangements have been used to procure antiretroviral (ARV) drugs through the
United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) (see, for example, WHO (2007), Dickens
(2011), and Huff-Rousselle (2012)). Such arrangements also exist within countries, for example,
in Brazil with the Price Registration System (PR), which allows several public agencies to or-
ganize a joint competitive bidding to purchase goods at uniform prices and terms (Barbosa and
Fiuza (2011)).
Empirically, much of the evidence comes from the health literature and consists of mean
price comparisons and qualitative reviews of procurement systems. Contributions analyzing price
changes include Kim and Skordis-Worrall (2017), who find pooled procurement by the Global
Fund to reduce the price of Efavirenz by 16 to 19 percent in a differences-in-differences analysis
3The reason behind this lies in the comparison between a marginal buyer’s contribution to the surplus generated
by trade and an infra-marginal buyer’s contribution. If the latter is greater (less) than the former, which is the
case when the supplier’s cost is convex, then a buyer group enables negotiation over a greater contribution.
4Specifically, they find a negative (positive) effect on prices when the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in terms of
suppliers’ (buyers’) payoffs is selected.
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of WHO Global price report mechanism (GPRM) data from 2004 to 2013, and Wirtz et al.
(2009), who find no effect of procurement volume for twelve ARVs using the same data. Seidman
and Atun (2017) provide a literature review of thirty-eight papers tracked through PubMed,
Embase, CINAHL and the Health Economic Evaluation Database and provide several examples
of contributions concluding cost savings from pooled procurement.
More recently, a few papers in the economic literature have addressed pooled procurement, in
particular through the lens of e-procurement. Bandiera et al. (2009) show that pooled procure-
ment reduces inefficiencies (‘passive waste’) in the Italian context, although they do not focus
on health procurement per se, and Barbosa and Fiuza (2011) show that the effect of pooled
procurement contracts in Brazil may vary depending on the composition of the pool of buyers.
Specifically, they conclude that adding buyers with higher credit risk may drive up the price paid
by the buyer group. Danzon et al. (2015) focus on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and malaria drugs
in a cross-country cross-drug analysis for low and middle income countries. They find that higher
per capita income and income inequality lead to higher prices, and that tendered procurement
significantly reduces prices.
None of these studies, however, relies on large cross-country, cross-pharmaceutical class drug
price data or addresses potential confounding factors related to the market structure of suppliers,
an issue that appears to be key for drug procurement in LMICs, given the large potential market
power accruing to large pharmaceutical firms in certain regions or types of drugs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the procurement institutions in our
sample countries. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 provides details about the
data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the econometric results, and Section 6 dis-
cusses policy implications and concludes. Proofs of the theoretical results, additional descriptive
statistics and robustness checks are presented in the Appendix.
2 Procurement Systems
Table 1 provides, for the seven countries included, information on socioeconomic characteristics
(GDP per capita and population) and the structure of the health sector, including the size of the
health market, the structure of health expenditures, and the type of data covered in this paper.
As shown in the table, these countries’ health sectors constitute a sample with relatively
diverse characteristics. Level of development ranges from low income (Senegal and Zambia) to
upper middle income (Serbia and South Africa), and both small and large countries population-
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wise are included. Accordingly, there is substantial variation, by a factor of 15, in the size of the
health commodity market.
In terms of the structure of spending and the role of the public vs. private sector, the share of
general government spending as a percentage of GDP varies from 1 to more than 5 percent. There
are similarly large variations in the shares of private and out-of-pocket spending. Finally, at least
one of the countries in the sample, Zambia, relies heavily on external aid (for approximately
one-fourth of all spending).
Each procurement system has its particularities. For the purpose of this paper, and given the
available data, we classify countries’ procurement systems into the following groups.
• Countries with only private data available: these include Senegal and Kerala.
• Countries with both private and public data, for which:
– The public sector purchases are fully centralized through a central medical store
(CMS): this category includes Tunisia and Zambia.
– The public sector operates through both centralized purchase mechanisms and decen-
tralized purchases: this category covers the Philippines, Serbia, and South Africa.
Regarding the last group, Table 2 shows, for the molecules included in our analysis, which
drugs are procured centrally by country. Importantly, all three countries present within-therapeutic
area variation in terms of the coverage of centralized procedures, so for each of these countries,
our sample of molecules includes some cancer drugs that are covered by these procedures and
some that are not. Note that it is possible that molecules included in the central procurement
process are also procured in a decentralized manner by specific health institutions.
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In Appendix A, we provide more details on the characteristics of the procurement systems of
each of these groups of countries, focusing specifically on the nature of the purchase mechanisms
in the public sector for the subset of countries for which data on public purchases are available.
Table 2: Molecules procured centrally by country
South Africa Philippines Serbia
Therapeutic area Molecule
Anemia ERYTHROPOIETIN ALPHA 1 0 0
Antiulcerants OMEPRAZOLE 1 0 1
Antihypertensives BISOPROLOL 0 0 1
Antihypertensives ENALAPRIL 1 1 1
Antibiotics AMOXICILLIN 1 1 1
Antibiotics AMPICILLIN 1 1 0
Antibiotics CEFTRIAXONE 1 0 1
Antibiotics AMOXICILLIN—CLAVULANIC ACID 1 0 1
Antiparasitics ARTESUNATE 0 1 0
Antiparasitics ARTEMETHER—LUMEFANTRINE 1 1 0
Antiparasitics ALBENDAZOLE 1 0 0
Arthritis Immunosuppressants DICLOFENAC 1 0 1
Asthma COPD&SALBUTAMOL 1 0 1
Cancer DOCETAXEL 0 1 0
Cancer IMATINIB 0 0 0
Cancer RITUXIMAB 1 0 1
Cancer PACLITAXEL 0 1 1
Cancer TRASTUZUMAB 0 1 1
Cancer CAPECITABINE 1 0 0
Cancer CISPLATIN 1 1 1
Contraceptives hormones MEDROGESTONE 0 0 0
Contraceptives hormones MEDROXYPROGESTERONE 1 1 0
Contraceptives hormones ETHINYLESTRADIOL—LEVONORGESTREL 1 0 1
Contraceptives hormones LEVONORGESTREL 1 0 0
Contraceptives hormones ETHINYLESTRADIOL 0 0 0
Diabetes INSULIN 1 1 1
Diabetes METFORMIN 1 1 1
HIV Antiretrovirals TENOFOVIR DISOPROXIL 1 1 1
HIV Antiretrovirals EFAVIRENZ 1 1 1
HIV Antiretrovirals LAMIVUDINE 1 1 1
HIV Antiretrovirals SOFOSBUVIR 0 0 0
HIV Antiretrovirals TENOFOVIR—LAMIVUDINE—EFAVIRENZ 0 1 0
Lipid regulators SIMVASTATIN 1 1 1
Nervous system medications DIAZEPAM 1 0 1
Pain Analgesics PARACETAMOL 1 1 1
Tuberculosis CIPROFLOXACIN 1 1 1
Tuberculosis RIFAMPICIN 1 0 1
Vitamins and Minerals RETINOL 1 0 0
Vitamins and Minerals ZINC 1 1 0
Vitamins and Minerals RETINOL, CHOLECALCIFEROL 0 0 0
Notes: 1 denotes molecules procured centrally. Sources: South Africa: Master Procurement Catalogue
http://www.health.gov.za/index.php/component/phocadownload/category/196. The Philippines: DoH Matrix.
Serbia: INNs lists A, A1, B, and C.
3 Theoretical Model
In this section, we study theoretically the effect of centralized procurement on prices. The
existing literature on buyer groups typically assumes that buyers are non-price-takers in the
absence of pooled procurement and remain so if they engage in pooled procurement. By contrast,
we provide a model in which buyers are price-takers under decentralized procurement and suppose
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that centralization allows them to become non-price-takers. Which modeling strategy is better
depends on the specific environment one considers. In the case of large retailers forming buyer
groups (which has received much attention in the literature), it is natural to assume that buyers
are non-price-takers even in the absence of a buyer group. However, in our setting, i.e., drug
procurement in LMICs, it seems reasonable to assume that buyers (e.g., pharmacies and hospitals)
are price-takers if the system is fully decentralized.
We first derive the effect of centralized procurement on prices in a simple duopoly setting and
then show that our findings hold in a more general oligopoly setting.
3.1 Basic Setup
Consider two firms competing against each other and producing two differentiated products, 1
and 2, at marginal costs c1 and c2, respectively. Denote D1 (p1, p2) and D2 (p1, p2) as the demands
for products 1 and 2, respectively, when their prices are given by p1 and p2. We assume that
each firm i’s profit function is strictly concave in its own price and that its best-response function
Ri(.) is increasing in its rival’s price (i.e., prices are strategic complements). We suppose further
that a Nash equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2) to the Bertrand game exists and is unique.
Procurement of the two products can be decentralized or centralized. We suppose that the
Bertrand-Nash prices prevail under the decentralized regime. This implies that buyers are price-
takers in this scenario. By contrast, under centralized procurement, we suppose that a single
entity, say a governmental agency, negotiates prices by engaging in simultaneous Nash bargaining
with both firms. We assume that the governmental agency’s objective function takes the general
form W (p1, p2), where W (., .) is differentiable and decreasing over [c1,+∞) × [c2,+∞). For
instance, W (p1, p2) could be consumer surplus, social welfare or coverage. Thus, the prices that
arise under centralized procurement solve the following system of maximization programs:
max
p1≥c1
[(p1 − c1)D1 (p1, p2)]1−α1 [W (p1, p2)−W (∞, p2)]α1 (1)
max
p2≥c2
[(p2 − c2)D2 (p1, p2)]1−α2 [W (p1, p2)−W (p1,∞)]α2 (2)
where α1 ∈ (0, 1] and α2 ∈ (0, 1] capture the bargaining power of the governmental agency
in its negotiation with firms 1 and 2, respectively. Note that the limiting case α1 = α2 = 0
corresponds to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium that would prevail under
decentralized procurement). We assume that the solution to (1) (resp., (2)), which we denote
R˜1 (p2) (resp., R˜2 (p1)) is unique for any p2 (resp., p1) and characterized by the corresponding
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first-order condition. Moreover, we assume that the pair (p˜1, p˜2) solving the system exists and is
unique.
The following proposition compares prices under centralized procurement to those under
decentralized procurement.
Proposition 1. In our duopoly setting, prices under centralized procurement are lower than
prices under decentralized procurement.
Proof. See Appendix.
While this result is intuitive, it is not obvious because the strategic interaction between the
two firms generates equilibrium effects that could, in principle, lead to an ambiguous impact of
centralized procurement on equilibrium prices, despite the clear-cut effect of centralized procure-
ment on the price of one product given the price of the other product. We show, however, that in
a fairly general setting, the equilibrium prices do decrease when one switches from a decentralized
to a centralized procurement regime.
Further, it is easy to see that Proposition 1 would still hold if marginal costs were strictly
increasing or strictly decreasing. This result stands in sharp contrast to the existing papers
on buyer groups emphasizing the curvature of the cost function as a key determinant of the
profitability of a buyer group.
3.2 Generalization
We now consider a more general scenario in which N ≥ 2 firms compete in prices. We denote ci as
the marginal cost of firm i and assume again that the products sold by the firms are differentiated.
Denote p = (p1, p2, ..., pN ) as the vector consisting of all the prices set by the N firms, p−i as
the vector derived from p by removing firm i’s price pi, and Di (p) as the demand addressed to
firm i. We assume that firm i’s profit function is strictly concave in its own price and that its
best-response function Ri(p−i) is increasing in each of its rivals’ prices (i.e., prices are strategic
complements). We suppose that a Nash equilibrium p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2, ..., p∗N ) to the Bertrand game
exists and is unique. When N ≥ 3, we assume further that for each K ∈ {2, ..., N − 1} and for
any (pK+1, ..., pN ), the Bertrand game derived from the original game by fixing the prices of firms
K + 1, ..., N to (pK+1, ..., pN ) has a unique Nash equilibrium.
The prices that prevail under (fully) decentralized procurement are the Bertrand-Nash prices
p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2, ..., p∗N ), while the prices under centralized procurement, which we assume to exist
and be unique, solve the following maximization program:
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max
pi≥ci
[(pi − ci)Di (pi,p−i)]1−αi [W (pi,p−i)−W (∞,p−i)]α1 (3)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N , where αi ∈ (0, 1] captures the bargaining power of the governmental agency
in charge of centralized procurement vis-a`-vis firm i and W (.) is its objective function. We as-
sume that the latter is differentiable and decreasing over [c1,+∞) × [c2,+∞) × ... × [cN ,+∞)
and that the solution to (3) for a given p−i, which we denote Ri (p−i), is unique and character-
ized by the corresponding first-order condition. Moreover, we assume that the vector of prices
p˜ = (p˜1, p˜2, ..., p˜N ) under centralized procurement, i.e., the vector solving the N maximization
program above, exists and is unique.
When N ≥ 3, we further extend the above assumptions on the outcome of the simultaneous
bilateral negotiation game to the derived game in which the prices (pK+1, ..., pN ) are fixed while
the prices (p1, ..., pK) result from the maximization of the Nash products given by (3) for each
i = 1, 2, ...,K.
We are now able to compare prices under decentralized procurement to those under centralized
procurement. The next result shows that Proposition 1 generalizes to a setting with any number
N ≥ 2 of firms.
Proposition 2. In our oligopoly setting with an arbitrary number of firms N , prices under
centralized procurement are lower than prices under decentralized procurement.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that it is not necessary for the procurement of all products to be centralized for the
result above to hold. Even if only a subset of products is centrally procured, the prices of all
products will fall with respect to the decentralized regime. Thus, centralized procurement of
one or several drugs generates downward pressure on the prices of non-centrally procured drugs.
The key intuition behind this result lies in the strategic complementarity between the prices of
(imperfectly) substitutable products.5
A natural question that arises is how supply-side concentration affects the impact of central-
ized procurement on prices. In a setting such as ours with differentiated products, one way of
changing the supply-side concentration while leaving the set of available goods unchanged is to fix
the number of goods and allow some firms to produce more than a single good (e.g., to produce
5Note that with complementary products, the centralized procurement of a subset of products would drive
up the prices of the products outside that subset under the standard assumption that prices for complementary
products are strategic substitutes.
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a branded drug and a generic drug simultaneously).6 Under our assumptions, one can readily
check that increasing the number of products sold by a given firm (or, equivalently, merging two
or more firms) leads to higher prices under both centralized and decentralized procurement. This
result implies that the theoretical impact of supply-side concentration on the differences between
prices in the two procurement regimes is generally ambiguous, which suggests that this question
should be approached empirically, as we will do in Section 5.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data on drug purchases from IMS Health (IQVIA), which provides exhaustive information
on sales quantities and expenditures for 40 essential molecules across 16 therapeutic areas by
country, year and sector of purchase.
The sample covers seven LMICs with diverse drug procurement systems: four middle income
countries – the Philippines, three States in South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal, North West and Eastern
Cape), Serbia, and Tunisia – and three low income countries –Senegal, Zambia, and the state of
Kerala in India. The period covered is 2015-2017, with the exception of the Serbian data, which
corresponds to 2013-2016. Finally, as described in section 2 above, we observe purchases from
both the private and the public sector and whether these occur in a centralized or decentralized
manner.
Table 3 lists the molecules included in the analysis and the different therapeutic areas to
which they belong. This table also shows which molecules are purchased in which country. The
heterogeneity in the mix of drugs procured across countries is likely related to the different needs
of the respective populations, patent and regulatory policies, and supply-side factors, such as
producers’ marketing strategy.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics by country and sector/channel of procurement. The ta-
ble lists the number of molecules purchased and their mean price. It also shows the mean prices
of the nine molecules that are purchased in all the countries for which we have data: Amoxicillin-
clavulanic acid, Bisoprolol, Ciprofloxacin, Diclofenac, Enalapril, Metformin, Omeprazole, Salbu-
tamol, and Simvastatin. The mean prices are the prices per standard unit obtained as the ratio of
6Performing comparative statics with respect to N would be misleading in our setting as this would simulta-
neously affect the supply-side concentration and product variety. In an alternative setting with N homogeneous
goods produced by (single-product) firms competing in quantities, varying N would be a sound way of examining
the impact of supply-side concentration.
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total US dollars expenses on that molecule to the total number of standard units of that molecule
across the different brands and dosages.7
The comparison of mean prices shows considerable heterogeneity across countries and within
countries across procurement channels. For example, for the nine common molecules, the average
procurement cost per standard unit is $0.11 in the Philippines public centralized channel but $0.46
in the decentralized channel and $0.77 in the private sector. In South Africa, the private sector
pays much more than the public sector, but the difference between centralized and decentralized
procurement is small. On the contrary, in Serbia, the private sector mean price is lower than
that of the public sector. Additionally, surprisingly, low income countries do not necessarily pay
lower prices, as Senegal and Kerala pay much more than Tunisia and Serbia. Our first aim is to
estimate how much of these differences can be ascribed to different procurement procedures once
we account for country- and therapeutic area-level specific effects.
7A standard Unit (SU) is a standard IMS-derived measure of the number of doses and is measured differently
depending on the formulation of the medicine, with one SU usually being equal to one tablet, one capsule, one
suppository, one prefilled syringe/cartridge, pen, vial or ampule, one dose of an inhaled medicine or 5 ml of an
oral syrup or suspension. The SUs of topical treatments (granules, powders, pellets, eye and ear preparations) are
based on milliliters or grams. Note that SUs differ from WHO’s Defined Daily Dose (DDD). Importantly for our
analysis, SUs are consistent within countries over time.
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Table 3: List of molecules by country
Area Molecule
K
er
a
la
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
S
en
eg
a
l
S
er
b
ia
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
T
u
n
is
ia
Z
a
m
b
ia
Anemia ERYTHROPOIETIN ALPHA X X X
Antiulcerants OMEPRAZOLE X X X X X X X
Antihypertensives BISOPROLOL X X X X X X X
Antihypertensives ENALAPRIL X X X X X X X
Antibiotics CEFTRIAXONE X
Antibiotics AMOXICILLIN X
Antibiotics AMPICILLIN X X X X X
Antibiotics AMOXICILLIN—CLAVULANIC ACID X X X X X X X
Antiparasitics ARTEMETHER—LUMEFANTRINE X X X
Antiparasitics ARTESUNATE X X
Antiparasitics ALBENDAZOLE X X X X X X
Arthritis Immunosuppressants DICLOFENAC X X X X X X X
Asthma / COPD SALBUTAMOL X X X X X X X
Cancer CAPECITABINE X
Cancer CISPLATIN X X X X X
Cancer RITUXIMAB X X X X X
Cancer DOCETAXEL X
Cancer PACLITAXEL X X X X
Cancer TRASTUZUMAB X
Cancer IMATINIB X X X X X
Contraceptives hormones MEDROXYPROGESTERONE X X X X
Contraceptives hormones MEDROGESTONE X
Contraceptives hormones ETHINYLESTRADIOL—LEVONORGESTREL X X X X X X
Contraceptives hormones LEVONORGESTREL X
Contraceptives hormones ETHINYLESTRADIOL X
Diabetes INSULIN X X X X X X
Diabetes METFORMIN X X X X X X X
HIV Antiretrovirals TENOFOVIR—LAMIVUDINE—EFAVIRENZ X X X
HIV Antiretrovirals EFAVIRENZ X
HIV Antiretrovirals LAMIVUDINE X
HIV Antiretrovirals SOFOSBUVIR X X
HIV Antiretrovirals TENOFOVIR DISOPROXIL X
Lipid regulators SIMVASTATIN X X X X X X X
Nervous system medications DIAZEPAM X X X X X X X
Pain Analgesics PARACETAMOL X X X X X X
Tuberculosis CIPROFLOXACIN X X X X X X X
Tuberculosis RIFAMPICIN X X X X X
Vitamins and Minerals ZINC X X
Vitamins and Minerals RETINOL X X X X
Vitamins and Minerals RETINOL, CHOLECALCIFEROL X
Note: Molecules included in the sample, by country and therapeutic area.
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Table 4: Country-level price statistics
Country Channel Nb. of Mean Price Mean Price
Molecules all molecules common molecules
Kerala All 19 86.65 4.34
Private 19 86.65 4.34
Philippines All 21 6.72 .45
Private 21 5.62 .77
Public centralized 8 2.05 .11
Public decentralized 21 9.40 .46
Senegal All 24 30.94 3.93
Private 24 30.94 3.93
Serbia All 21 56.49 .13
Private 21 58.20 .11
Public centralized 15 71.16 .15
Public decentralized 6 8.51
SouthAfrica All 23 28.47 2.28
Private 23 53.65 3.34
Public centralized 19 12.79 1.68
Public decentralized 3 14.81 1.83
Tunisia All 30 21.36 .17
Private 26 .38 .26
Public centralized 30 39.28 .09
Zambia All 20 2.71 .28
Private 15 .97 .55
Note: Price in US$ by Standard Unit. Common molecules are AMOXICILLIN—CLAVULANIC ACID, BISOPROLOL,
CIPROFLOXACIN, DICLOFENAC, ENALAPRIL, METFORMIN, OMEPRAZOLE, SALBUTAMOL, SIMVASTATIN.
Mean price is unweighted by quantities.
Table 5 shows the coverage of our sample. In terms of expenses, the ATC3 categories included
in our data represent between 19 and 35% of expenses on all ATC3 and between 11 and 52% of
the expenses of the public sector.8 Within the selected ATC3 categories, there is large variation
in the share accounted for by the selected molecules, from South Africa, which has relatively low
coverage, to Tunisia and Zambia, where most of the public expenses are included.
8The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification System, controlled by the World Health Organi-
zation Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology (WHOCC), divides active substances into groups at
five different levels. The ATC3 level corresponds to the therapeutic/pharmacological subgroup.
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Table 5: Country-level statistics
Country Channel Expenses Expenses of Share of Expenses of Share of
All ATC3 Selected ATC3 All (%) Selected Mol. selected
(1000 $) ATC3 (%)
Kerala All 60202227 13851093 23.0 1404918 10.1
Private 60202227 13851093 23.0 1404918 10.1
Philippines All 3634369 801021 22.0 365225 45.5
Private 3406863 681674 20.0 272761 40.0
Public 227533 119346 52.4 92389 77.4
Serbia All 728293 179468 24.6 77148 42.9
Private 369690 100733 27.2 34988 34.7
Public 359057 78694 21.9 42216 53.6
SouthAfrica All 11394839 2114377 18.5 37209 1.7
Private 7768901 1719998 22.1 19379 1.1
Public 3626747 396451 10.9 17780 4.4
Tunisia All 1052863 291687 27.7 198881 68.1
Private 775158 253673 32.7 167657 66.0
Public 277599 38014 13.6 31196 82.0
Zambia All 360137 127114 35.2 122888 96.6
Private 20990 1533 7.3 126 8.2
Public 340703 129992 38.1 122878 94.5
Note: Values are in thousand US dollars. Selected ATCs are those of the 40 molecules studied. Exhaustive ATC3-level data
on Senegal are missing.
For a given molecule, when generics are available, it is possible to purchase different brands
(different products) from different manufacturers. Table 6 shows the number of molecules pur-
chased and the corresponding number of products and manufacturers. The table further breaks
this information down by procurement sector and channel and shows that the public sector usually
purchases fewer molecules and fewer products from fewer manufacturers.
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Table 6: Country-level product and manufacturer statistics
Country Channel Nb. of Nb. of Nb. of
Molecules Products Manufacturers
Kerala All 19 304 136
Private 19 304 136
Philippines All 21 526 263
Private 21 488 255
Public centralized 8 11 4
Public decentralized 21 310 163
Senegal All 24 117 76
Private 24 117 76
Serbia All 21 89 33
Private 21 87 32
Public centralized 15 68 28
Public decentralized 6 15 11
SouthAfrica All 23 137 45
Private 23 133 45
Public centralized 19 79 32
Public decentralized 3 8 7
Tunisia All 30 167 77
Private 26 152 68
Public centralized 30 122 59
Zambia All 20 53 30
Private 15 40 30
Note: Based on the sample molecules (IMS data). Yearly average over 2015-2017 for all countries except the Philippines
(2013-2016). Private sector only for Kerala and Senegal.
Table 7: Therapeutic area expenditure shares by country
Area
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Anemia 5.79 % 1.17 %
Antiulcerants 7.18 % 8.31 % 27.14 % 1.38 % 19.94 % 6.77 % .01 %
Antihypertensives 5.59 % 2.40 % .10 % 20.45 % 9.12 % 2.99 %
Antibiotics 42.27 % 13.70 % 6.96 % 7.66 % 2.57 % 39.00 % .05 %
Antiparasitics 2.24 % 4.48 % 26.93 % 10.03 % .73 % 14.51 %
Arthritis Immunosuppressants 1.40 % 1.68 % 6.58 % 12.09 % 15.22 % 1.88 % .02 %
Asthma / COPD 5.15 % 7.80 % 7.57 % 1.62 % 6.83 % 1.48 % .05 %
Cancer .36 % 2.70 % .15 % 19.98 % 8.49 % 7.63 % .06 %
Contraceptives hormones 1.56 % 12.40 % .72 % 2.13 % 2.43 % 2.59 %
Diabetes 27.68 % 10.12 % 6.92 % 21.00 % 9.79 % 7.81 % .20 %
HIV Antiretrovirals 1.12 % 3.20 % .42 % 82.35 %
Lipid regulators .42 % 5.36 % 1.16 % 1.35 % 4.55 % 1.27 %
Nervous system medications .23 % .18 % .76 % 3.98 % .28 % .02 %
Pain Analgesics 20.00 % 5.86 % 5.65 % 4.57 % 21.51 % .08 %
Tuberculosis 4.74 % 4.69 % 8.86 % 3.48 % 3.16 % 1.54 %
Vitamins and Minerals .30 % .21 % .13 % .04 % 4.44 %
Note: Based on the sample molecules (IMS data). Yearly average over 2015-2017 for all countries except the Philippines
(2013-2016). Private sector only for Kerala and Senegal.
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Tables 7 to 9 provide additional descriptive statistics for the selected therapeutic areas and
molecules included in our analysis. Table 7 details the distribution of country-level expendi-
tures, showing that our sample provides relatively exhaustive coverage of therapeutic areas for
the countries in the sample.9 Table 8 shows the mean HHI concentration index of manufacturers
by therapeutic area, computed as the sum of squared market share (in quantities) of each manu-
facturer within the country, sector, year and therapeutic area. The results show large variations
in concentration and that many country-therapeutic areas display high provider concentrations.
A similar table using the C1 concentration index is provided in the Appendix. Finally, Table 9
shows the sample relative shares of public and private purchases by country.
Table 8: Concentration by therapeutic area for each country (HHI)
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Anemia 54.7 % 100.0 % 82.4 %
Antiulcerants 28.8 % 32.8 % 12.0 % 63.0 % 50.9 % 36.6 % 77.9 %
Antihypertensives 46.6 % 49.6 % 58.6 % 30.8 % 66.0 % 64.2 % 86.7 %
Antibiotics 11.3 % 39.5 % 79.7 % 47.2 % 20.4 % 29.9 % 51.1 %
Antiparasitics 23.6 % 100.0 % 29.1 % 86.5 % 95.3 % 96.8 %
Arthritis Immunosuppressants 22.5 % 42.9 % 18.6 % 45.0 % 49.2 % 56.9 % 86.0 %
Asthma / COPD 74.7 % 45.9 % 92.8 % 74.5 % 69.2 % 91.9 % 100.0 %
Cancer 86.9 % 50.0 % 66.3 % 48.7 % 51.4 % 50.2 % 100.0 %
Contraceptives hormones 74.0 % 94.8 % 81.1 % 62.6 % 70.8 % 97.5 %
Diabetes 14.7 % 39.8 % 55.9 % 47.0 % 47.9 % 42.7 % 100.0 %
HIV Antiretrovirals 51.8 % 73.7 % 77.5 % 100.0 %
Lipid regulators 59.6 % 32.4 % 35.9 % 46.3 % 71.4 % 57.4 % 97.8 %
Nervous system medications 80.6 % 72.2 % 100.0 % 67.8 % 76.3 % 84.7 % 99.1 %
Pain Analgesics 46.3 % 87.1 % 31.2 % 37.5 % 17.9 % 100.0 %
Tuberculosis 28.8 % 47.3 % 21.5 % 40.2 % 39.5 % 49.8 % 78.1 %
Vitamins and Minerals 98.2 % 79.1 % 96.7 % 99.6 % 17.7 %
Note: IMS data. Concentration (HHI) computed as the sum of squared market share (in quantities) of each manufacturer by
country, year, and therapeutic area for the sample molecules. Means over 2015-2017 for all countries except the Philippines
(2013-2016). Private sector only for Kerala and Senegal.
9Table 12 in the Appendix provides a benchmark consisting of the same information for all molecules in these
categories.
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Table 9: Country-level expenditure statistics
Country Channel Expenses Expenses Quantity
(US$) Share Share
Kerala All 1405081814
Private 1405081814 100 % 100 %
Philippines All 365435032
Private 272765024 74.64 % 88.39 %
Public centralized 18725270 5.12 % 8.35 %
Public decentralized 73944732 20.23 % 3.25 %
Senegal All 7106454
Private 7106454 100 % 100 %
Serbia All 77128992
Private 34929636 45.28 % 59.70 %
Public centralized 39531507 51.25 % 40.01 %
Public decentralized 2667852 3.45 % .27 %
SouthAfrica All 101292416
Private 80913947 79.88 % 61.41 %
Public centralized 20350720 20.09 % 38.58 %
Public decentralized 27752 .02 % .00 %
Tunisia All 198926800
Private 167732000 84.31 % 71.52 %
Public centralized 31194800 15.68 % 28.47 %
Zambia All 121784771
Private 119796 .09 % .15 %
Note: IMS data. Share of total sample expenditures by sector and channel. Means over 2015-2017 for all countries except
the Philippines (2013-2016). Private sector only for Kerala and Senegal.
5 The Effects of Procurement Systems on Prices
We now turn to the econometric analysis of the effect of procurement systems on average prices.
This section presents estimation at the product level (standard units). In Appendix D, we include
the results of estimations at the molecule level. While this higher level of aggregation reduces the
sample from over six thousand observations to approximately one thousand, the results remain
essentially unchanged.
5.1 Effects on Average Product Price
We estimate the following regression model:
log(pjcst) = αjc + γa(j)t + λs + jcst (4)
where j is the product, c is the country, s is the sector in the country (private, public centralized
or public decentralized) and t is the year. The parameter αjc is a product*country specific effect
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that is sometimes restricted to be additively separable, as follows: αjc = αj +αc. The parameter
γa(j)t is an area*year specific effect (where a(j) denotes the therapeutic area of product j) that
is sometimes restricted to be additively separable, as follows: γa(j)t = γa(j) + γt.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 10 show these regressions using the log price of products as the
dependent variable. Centralized procurement allows the public sector to obtain prices that are
between 40 and 44% lower. This result is stable when including product*country and area*year
fixed effects. Notably, the results are driven not only by cross-country and cross-procurement
mechanism variation but also by within-therapeutic area and cross-molecule variation, as depicted
in Table 2.
We then interact the procurement channel variables with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of the suppliers in each therapeutic area, country and year in order to examine the role
of concentration on prices within each procurement mechanism. Column (4) shows the results
obtained by OLS. There is, however, an obvious problem of endogeneity of HHI indexes within this
price equation. Since prices affect demand and market share, unobserved factors at the country-
therapeutic area-year level likely affect both demands and prices and thus generate unobserved
correlations with both price and market share. Dafny et al. (2012) use also HHI index to examine
the role of market concentration on health insurance premium in the US. In order to instrument
the HHI index, they use the changes in local markets HHI due to the merger of two big insurance
companies whose local pre-merger market shares vary. Our strategy relies on the cross country
correlation of HHI indexes that covary for many reasons including similar reasons of company
mergers but also entry of firms in drug markets when patents expire or when new innovative
products arrive. In column (5), we thus use a two-stage least-squares estimation where we
instrument for these interactions.
We use the HHI indexes of the same therapeutic area in other countries as instruments for the
HHI indexes in a given country. These instrumental variables are indeed correlated with the HHI
index in the country because HHI indexes are correlated across countries through the supply-side
market structures, which have common determinants across countries since most manufacturing
firms are international and operate in many countries. However, the demand-side factors that
explain the variation of HHI indexes across countries are likely to be uncorrelated.
When using this IV estimation technique, we find that the price reduction obtained by the
public sector using a centralized procurement system is negative and significant and that it is
lower when the HHI index is higher, converging to zero when the HHI index reaches 94%. In our
sample, country-therapeutic area HHI values at or above 94% are not exceptional. This shows
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that the supply-side market power of firms matters and that it may limit the ability of the public
sector centralized procurement mechanism to induce lower prices.
Table 10: Product-level effect of procurement and market power on prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Generic available -0.2853 -0.1578 -0.2996 -0.3044 -0.2962
(0.1947) (0.1637) (0.2978) (0.2973) (0.3016)
Nb mol. purchased by Area -0.2454*** -0.0089 -0.0899 -0.0906 -0.0489
(0.0362) (0.1375) (0.1557) (0.1556) (0.1582)
Public decentralized -0.0692 -0.0492 -0.0474 0.0946 -0.0766
(0.0548) (0.0460) (0.0461) (0.0841) (0.1841)
Public centralized -0.3998*** -0.4356*** -0.4365*** -0.1299 -1.1874***
(0.0471) (0.0409) (0.0410) (0.0914) (0.2748)
Public decentralized*HHI 0.0265 -0.1704
(0.2122) (0.5261)
Public centralized*HHI -0.2302 1.2602**
(0.1492) (0.4218)
Private*HHI 0.4671*** -0.2676
(0.1178) (0.2137)
N 6126 6126 6126 6126 6126
Area fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area*year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Molecule fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule*country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Note: HHI index is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, whose support is [0,1]. 2SLS refers to the two-stage least-squares
method, where variables interacted with the HHI index are instrumented. Instrumental variables are the interactions with
the average HHI of the same area in other countries. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The above results show the potential price reduction obtained by the public sector by using
a centralized procurement system for different levels of supplier concentration measured through
the HHI index. The regression results show clearly that centralized procurement commands lower
prices, as long as the supplier HHI index is low. By contrast, one can compute the combined
effect confidence intervals, which show that the price difference across channels ceases to be
significantly different for HHI values of approximately 0.6. In addition, note that neither private
nor decentralized public procurement is affected much by HHI.
We have argued that the public centralized procurement channel allows for lower prices, which
in turn leads to greater quantities being purchased. We have also shown that this effect is stronger
the lower the supplier concentration index. Starting from actual HHI levels observed in the data,
we can perform a reduced-form estimation of the impact of an increase in competition among
suppliers on the potential increase in the quantity procured, keeping budget constant.
We do this by regressing the log of product quantities on the interaction between HHI and
procurement channels at the country, therapeutic area, and year level. When instrumenting
for HHI, in the same way as in Table 10, we find a coefficient of -8.2, significant at the 1%
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level for centralized procurement. This means that a reduction in supplier concentration from
the median HHI value of 0.28 to the 25th percentile value of 0.17 would increase the quantity
purchased through public centralized procurement by 82%. In countries where the amount of
drugs purchased publicly fails to satisfy internal demand, this suggests large potential gains in
coverage from increasing market competition.
5.2 Reduced-Form Demand
The previous empirical evidence is not complete proof of a causal relationship between pro-
curement mechanisms and prices. Although the results rely on within country-therapeutic area
variation across molecules in each period, the short time span of the sample does not allow us to
observe variations in the procurement mechanisms used within a country-therapeutic area over
time, which could be interpreted as a natural experiment. In the absence of such exogenous
variation, we can, however, test for potential confounding factors.
In particular, we test whether the price differences across these mechanisms could result from
differences in demand elasticities. Specifically, one concern is that the lower prices found for the
centralized procurement channel may in fact reflect higher demand elasticities.
To assess this possibility, we estimate reduced-form elasticity relationships using our quantity
and expenditure data. Specifically, we use the following reduced-form demand equation:
log(yjcst) = αjc + γa(j)t + λs + βs log(pjcst) + jcst (5)
where yjcst is the aggregate demand of product j in country c, sector s and year t and the
parameters αjc and γa(j)t are defined as above. The parameter βs is the reduced-form price
elasticity of demand, which is initially constrained to be identical across sectors and then allowed
to vary.
This demand equation is likely to suffer from price endogeneity. Therefore, in columns (4)
and (6) of Table 11, we implement 2SLS estimates using the mean prices of the same products
in the same procurement channel of all other countries as instrumental variables.
Table 11 columns (1) to (3) show an average price elasticity of between -0.72 and -0.75 when
we do not instrument prices, which is quite stable across different fixed effects combinations.
When we instrument for price (column (4)), this average elasticity increases in magnitude to
-0.94. When we allow the elasticity to differ across procurement mechanisms (column (5)) and
instrument for prices, as indicated above (column (6)), we find a price elasticity of approximately
-1 for the private sector and the decentralized procurement public sector and a slightly lower
value of approximately -0.8 for the centralized public sector.
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These results supports the idea that elasticities are not higher in absolute value in the public
sector with centralized procurement and, therefore, that the difference in demand elasticities
is unlikely to be a confounding factor explaining why prices are lower for centralized public
procurement.
Table 11: Reduced-form demand at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(price product) -0.7539*** -0.7192*** -0.7183*** -0.9433***
(0.0348) (0.0419) (0.0421) (0.2478)
log price * Private -0.6467*** -1.0489***
(0.0444) (0.2596)
log price * Public decentralized -0.3595*** -0.9819***
(0.0723) (0.2690)
log price * Public centralized -1.1919*** -0.7878**
(0.0630) (0.2759)
Generic available -0.2029 0.1635 -0.1865 -0.0955 -0.3363 -0.0289
(0.5295) (0.5296) (0.9645) (0.9515) (0.9560) (0.9604)
Public decentralized -1.0944*** -1.0443*** -1.0461*** -0.9716*** -0.7728*** -0.9157***
(0.1491) (0.1490) (0.1493) (0.1509) (0.1607) (0.1931)
Public centralized 0.1059 -0.0404 -0.0406 -0.1523 -0.7326*** 0.1539
(0.1288) (0.1338) (0.1341) (0.1698) (0.1514) (0.2569)
N 6123 6123 6123 5886 6123 5886
Area fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area*year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule*country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Note: 2SLS indicates that the two-stage least-squares prices in other markets are used as instrumental variables for prices.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
6 Conclusion
We analyze the impact of pooled procurement on drug purchase prices and study how this effect
depends on drug market demand- and supply-side concentration in seven low and middle income
countries (LMICs) using cross-country, cross-procurement channel, as well as within-therapeutic
area, and cross-molecule variation in how public buyers procure drugs. Consistent with the
predictions of a simple theoretical model, our empirical results show that centralized procurement
systems allow public buyers to obtain significantly lower prices.
We then show that the price reduction effect of public centralized procurement depends on
the concentration of firms on the supply side and their market power. Indeed, the effect vanishes
when the public sector faces a high concentration of suppliers for a given product. Finally, we
show that the lower prices in centralized public procurement are unlikely to be explained by
higher demand elasticity. If anything, this elasticity appears to be lower in the public centralized
sector.
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The price reductions found in this paper may be driven by two complementary mechanisms.
First, demand-side concentration may enhance public buyers’ bargaining power, allowing them
to extract lower prices, ceteris paribus. In addition, centralized procurers are likely to buy
larger quantities, thus securing price discounts on larger orders. These two channels are hard to
disentangle, as they occur simultaneously. Further research is needed to identify the nature of
market interactions between buyers and sellers and to separate their effect from that of transaction
size.
Finally, our results have important policy implications. Indeed, simple reduced form esti-
mations of the impact of introducing additional supply-side competition show large potential
increases in the quantity of drugs that public sectors could purchase for a given budget. In future
research, we hope to confirm these insights for a larger sample of countries and periods, as well
as using cases of variation in procurement mechanisms used within a country-therapeutic area
over time.
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A Country-level Procurement Systems
A.1 Fully Centralized Public Sector Purchases
A.1.1 Tunisia
Tunisia has a fully centralized procurement system. Law N90-105 entrusts the central medical
store “Pharmacie Centrale de Tunisie” (PCT) with several key missions, among which:
• Sourcing and import monopoly of all drugs, chemicals, instruments, accessories, etc.
• Packaging and supply to wholesalers, laboratories and pharmacies.
• Informing physicians and pharmacists about all health related laws and regulations.
The Tunisian drug market is divided in two sectors, both with a predominance of local production:
The hospital sector, with supply to the public structures exclusively provided by the PCT, and the
retail sector, in which distribution is monopolized by the PCT only for the wholesale distribution
of imported products.
A.1.2 Zambia
Healthcare in Zambia is provided both by the government and by faith-based organizations
(FBO), with an important reliance on external donations to supply essential medicines to the
population (see Table 1).
The Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA) is a centralized agency responsible for pro-
curement of resources for all sectors, including the health sector (Republic of Zambia, 2008). The
ZPPA handles all government expenditures above 500,000 ZMW or USD $100 000 (Engstrand,
2013). Some of ZPPA’s responsibilities as lead of government procurement are delegated to an
institutional tender committee in the Ministry of Health (MoH) called the Procurement and Sup-
plies Unit. This unit handles smaller tenders and purchases that are valued under 500,000 ZMW.
The MoH is instructed by the ZPPA to use the following three procurement strategies: interna-
tional competitive bidding, limited international bidding, and national competitive bidding.
In addition, The Churches Health Association of Zambia is an FBO that procures health
supplies, medical devices, and essential medicines for primary and secondary mission hospitals in
Zambia.
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A.2 Mixed Centralized and Decentralized Public Sector Purchases
The Philippines, South Africa, and Serbia all present a mix of molecules procured centrally, and
others not included in the central contracting process. This section describes briefly the main
institutional features of their procurement systems.
A.2.1 Philippines
The central public health agency in the Philippines is the Department of Health (DoH), which
provides national policy direction and regulation. Medicines procurement in the Philippines
relies on both centralized and decentralized procedures: the DOH procures centrally, through
annual purchase orders, but procurement is also done at all government levels, including retained
hospitals, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays (smallest administrative division in the
Philippines).
The DOH procures medicines centrally for:
• National programs (single condition/small group health problems for which the objective
focus is the short or medium term, such as tuberculosis).
• Medicines access programs (e.g., cancer).
• Emergencies and disasters.
The Government Procurement Reform Act of 2003 states that procurement should be under-
taken through competitive bidding except under highly exceptional circumstances. In 2014, the
DoH released a Drug Price Reference Index (DPRI) which made it mandatory that all public buy-
ers adhere to a price ceiling when procuring drugs listed in Philippine National Drug Formulary
(PNDF). However, some bid failures have been reported.
Table 2 shows the list of molecules that are included in centralized purchase, based on the DoH
matrix of commodities. Note that drugs that are bought centrally and locally are not mutually
exclusive. The DoH buys drugs according to what the program managers forecast and quantify
in coordination with local facilities and hospitals, and these also have the freedom to procure the
same drugs by themselves.
A.2.2 South Africa
South Africa has a national central tendering mechanism run by the National Treasury. Within
that framework, provinces hold budgets and procure most of their commodities through 13 to 14
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national contracts accounting for 90 percent of total spending. These contracts typically last for
2 to 3 years, with indicative volumes but no minimum commitments
HIV, TB, and Oncology are strategic focus areas for procurement. Historically, the South
African government made a decision to not accept donations of commodities to favor local pro-
duction. As a result, there are several local big players (Aspen, Cipla, Adcock Ingram), and
many smaller ones, now making up approximately 20% of market value. Tendering practices also
allow for local preference to encourage domestic firms, but in practice, these are often not able to
compete on price, so imports remain very important. In order to sell products in South Africa,
international manufacturers are required to contract any part of the supply chain (formulation,
packaging, warehousing, and distribution) to a local player.
The Master Procurement Catalogue (MPC) provides all the medicines purchased through
national tenders. The list of molecules covered by this arrangement is in Table 2.
A.2.3 Serbia
Serbia operates medicines and medical supplies procurement via a centralized procurement pro-
cess managed by the Health Insurance Fund (HIF) on behalf of Healthcare Institutions (HCIs)
(Limited, 2012). Article 48 of the Public Procurement Law attributes HIF contracting author-
ity for good, services or works on behalf of medical institutions or health institutions within a
Network Plan. It is also possible for HCIs to make orders for items, which are not on the list of
approved medicines, however HIF is not obliged to provide funds for these so HCIs need to fund
this themselves.
In 2014, the Republic of Serbia received a 29.1 million euros loan from the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) towards the cost of the Second Serbian Health
Project (SSHP) which was scheduled to run from 2014-2019. The SSHP aim is to improve
the efficiency of pharmaceutical and medical products procurement through the introduction of
centralized procurement of drugs.
Medicines are procured centrally based on a list of medicines, which HIF has agreed to fund:
lists A and A1, which include pharmaceuticals procured by brand name, and lists B and C, by
molecule names. Based on this information, molecules included in the centralized procurement
process are in in Table 2.
A.3 Countries With Only Private Sector Purchases
For Senegal and Kerala, we have access to only to private sector sales, which cover approximately
70% of the market for Senegal and 95% for Kerala.
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B Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us first consider the decentralized system. The first-order conditions defining R1(.) and
R2(.) are given, respectively, by
(p1 − c1) ∂D1
∂p1
(p1, p2) +D1 (p1, p2) = 0
and
(p2 − c2) ∂D2
∂p1
(p1, p2) +D2 (p1, p2) = 0
while the first-order conditions defining R˜1 (.) and R˜2 (.) are given, respectively, by
(1− α1) [(p1 − c1)D1 (p1, p2)]−α1
[
(p1 − c1) ∂D1∂p1 (p1, p2) +D1 (p1, p2)
]
[W (p1, p2)−W (∞, p2)]α1
+ [(p1 − c1)D1 (p1, p2)]1−α1 α1 [W (p1, p2)−W (∞, p2)]α1−1 ∂W∂p1 = 0
and
(1− α2) [(p2 − c2)D2 (p1, p2)]−α2
[
p2
∂D2
∂p1
(p1, p2) +D2 (p1, p2)
]
[W (p1, p2)−W (p1,∞)]α2
+ [(p2 − c2)D2 (p1, p2)]1−α2 α2 [W (p1, p2)−W (p1,∞)]α2−1 ∂W∂p2 = 0.
Using the fact that W (., .) is decreasing in both its arguments, we get that[
R˜1 (p2)− c1
] ∂D1
∂p1
(
R˜1 (p2) , p2
)
+D1
(
R˜1 (p2) , p2
)
> [R1 (p2)− c1] ∂D1
∂p1
(R1 (p2) , p2) +D1 (R1 (p2) , p2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
and[
R˜2 (p1)− c2
] ∂D2
∂p2
(
p1, R˜2 (p1)
)
+D2
(
p1, R˜2 (p1)
)
> [R2 (p1)− c2] ∂D2
∂p2
(p1, R2 (p1)) +D1 (p1, R2 (p1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
.
This, combined with the concavity of each firm’s profit function leads to
R˜1 (p2) < R1 (p2)
for any p2 and
R˜2 (p1) < R2 (p1)
for any p1.
Let us now compare the prices under the decentralized and centralized procurement systems.
Note first that:
R1 ◦R2 (p∗1) = p∗1
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Moreover, it must hold that
R1 ◦R2 (p1) > p1
for p1 < p
∗
1, and
R1 ◦R2 (p1) < p1
for p1 > p
∗
1. To see why, notice that if the latter conditions did not hold, the curves of R1(.) and
R2(.) would intersect at least twice, which would violate the equilibrium uniqueness assumption.
Assume now that p˜1 ≥ p∗1. This implies that
R1 ◦R2 (p˜1) ≤ p˜1
However, since R˜1 (p2) < R1 (p2) and R˜2 (p1) < R2 (p1), we have that
R˜1 ◦ R˜2(p1) < R1 ◦R2 (p1)
for any p1, and in particular
p˜1 = R˜1 ◦ R˜2 (p˜1) < R1 ◦R2 (p˜1) .
which leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, p˜1 < p
∗
1. Likewise, p˜2 < p
∗
2.
Proof of Proposition 2
We proceed by induction. Proposition 1 shows that the result is true for the case N = 2. We
now show that the result holds for a given N ≥ 3 whenever it holds for N − 1, which will prove
the result.
Let us assume that the result holds for an oligopoly with a number N − 1 of firms. Fixing pN
turns both theN -firm Bertrand game and theN -firm bilateral negotiation game into anN−1-firm
Bertrand game and an (N − 1)-firm bilateral negotiation game, respectively, with demand func-
tions Dˆi defined by Dˆi (p1, p2, ..., pN−1) = Di (p1, p2, ..., pN ), and an objective function Wˆ defined
by Wˆ (p1, p2, ..., pN−1) = W (p1, p2, ..., pN ). Therefore, denoting
(
R∗1 (pN ) , R∗2 (pN ) , ..., R∗N−1 (pN )
)
the
Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game and where pN is fixed, and
(
R˜∗1 (pN ) , R˜∗2 (pN ) , ..., R˜∗N−1 (pN )
)
the prices under centralized procurement when pN is fixed, we have that
R˜∗i (pN ) < R
∗
i (pN )
for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
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Note that p∗N satisfies the following fixed point property.
p∗N = RN
(
R∗1 (p
∗
N ) , R
∗
2 (p
∗
N ) , ..., R
∗
N−1 (p
∗
N )
)
Moreover, it must hold that
RN
(
R∗1 (p
∗
N ) , R
∗
2 (p
∗
N ) , ..., R
∗
N−1 (p
∗
N )
)
> pN
for any pN < p
∗
N and
RN
(
R∗1 (p
∗
N ) , R
∗
2 (p
∗
N ) , ..., R
∗
N−1 (p
∗
N )
)
< pN
for any pN > p
∗
N ; otherwise, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium p
∗ would be violated.
Let us now assume that p˜N ≥ p∗N and show that this leads to contradiction. From p˜N ≥ p∗N
and the above observation it then follows that
RN
(
R∗1 (p˜N ) , R
∗
2 (p˜N ) , ..., R
∗
N−1 (p˜N )
)
< p˜N .
Moreover,
R˜N (p1, ..., pN−1) < RN (p1, ..., pN−1)
for any p1, ..., pN−1 (this results from a comparison of the FOCs defining RN (p1, ..., pN−1) and
R˜N (p1, ..., pN−1) similar to the one we performed in the duopoly case). This, combined with
the facts that R˜∗i (pN ) < R
∗
i (pN ) and R
∗
i (.) is increasing (by strategic complementarity) for
i = 1, .., N − 1, leads to
R˜N
(
R˜∗1 (p˜N ) , R˜
∗
2 (p˜N ) , ..., R˜
∗
N−1 (p˜N )
)
< RN
(
R˜∗1 (p˜N ) , R˜
∗
2 (p˜N ) , ..., R˜
∗
N−1 (p˜N )
)
< RN
(
R∗1 (p˜N ) , R
∗
2 (p˜N ) , ..., R
∗
N−1 (p˜N )
)
Since R˜N
(
R˜∗1 (p˜N ) , R˜∗2 (p˜N ) , ..., R˜∗N−1 (p˜N )
)
= p˜N we get that
p˜N < RN
(
R∗1 (p˜N ) , R
∗
2 (p˜N ) , ..., R
∗
N−1 (p˜N )
)
which leads to a contradiction.
Hence, p˜N < p
∗
N . Then, it follows that
R∗i (p˜N ) < R
∗
i (p
∗
N )
for any i = 1, ..., N−1 (because R∗i (.) is increasing). This, combined with the fact that R˜∗i (p˜N ) <
R∗i (p˜N ) yields
p˜i = R˜
∗
i (p˜N ) < R
∗
i (p
∗
N ) = p
∗
i
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for any i = 1, ..., N − 1. This completes the proof.
C Additional Tables
C.1 Therapeutic Area Expenditure Shares
Table 12: Therapeutic Area Expenditure Shares by Country
Area
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Anemia 2.51 % 3.93 % 1.70 % 1.25 % 1.61 % .29 %
Antiulcerants 7.40 % 3.14 % 3.44 % 4.53 % 5.05 % .13 %
Antihypertensives 7.78 % 14.94 % 18.41 % 8.87 % 12.94 % .44 %
Antibiotics 17.30 % 18.14 % 7.97 % 12.64 % 20.27 % 6.11 %
Antiparasitics .57 % .20 % .01 % 2.81 % .39 % 5.83 %
Arthritis Immunosuppressants 5.16 % 5.32 % 8.48 % 5.93 % 8.34 % .83 %
Asthma / COPD 8.89 % 4.90 % 6.73 % 4.23 % 3.79 % .10 %
Cancer .66 % 4.07 % 13.12 % 3.19 % 13.57 % 1.71 %
Contraceptives hormones 4.90 % 3.67 % 4.03 % 5.35 % 3.99 % 3.69 %
Diabetes 20.40 % 8.43 % 9.97 % 5.80 % 6.90 % .22 %
HIV Antiretrovirals .08 % .01 % 2.03 % 9.14 % .03 % 44.82 %
Lipid regulators 6.76 % 3.97 % 2.63 % 2.05 % 3.13 % .05 %
Nervous system medications 6.11 % 3.17 % 11.09 % 7.68 % 6.81 % .12 %
Pain Analgesics 2.51 % 6.04 % 4.31 % 8.86 % 6.74 % 1.21 %
Tuberculosis .41 % 1.72 % .01 % 2.81 % .46 % .54 %
Vitamins and Minerals 7.57 % 13.92 % 1.36 % 5.61 % 3.29 % .21 %
Other .92 % 4.36 % 4.62 % 9.17 % 2.60 % 33.62 %
Note: Based on all molecules (IMS data). Means over 2015-2017 for all countries except Philippines (2013-2016). Private
sector only for Kerala and Senegal.
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C.2 Concentration Index (C1)
Table 13: Concentration by Area for each Country (C1)
Area
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Anemia 66.4 % 100.0 % 88.1 %
Antiulcerants 44.4 % 44.0 % 18.4 % 72.1 % 61.4 % 50.4 % 81.3 %
Antihypertensives 62.2 % 62.2 % 69.6 % 43.7 % 76.5 % 75.1 % 91.7 %
Antibiotics 21.9 % 51.9 % 88.3 % 63.2 % 29.0 % 44.5 % 61.9 %
Antiparasitics 33.1 % 100.0 % 40.0 % 91.8 % 97.5 % 98.2 %
Arthritis Immunosuppressants 37.4 % 57.5 % 31.3 % 57.9 % 61.6 % 63.1 % 90.6 %
Asthma / COPD 84.8 % 62.9 % 96.2 % 84.0 % 78.9 % 95.7 % 100.0 %
Cancer 90.6 % 61.7 % 76.0 % 58.8 % 65.0 % 64.4 % 100.0 %
Contraceptives hormones 84.4 % 97.2 % 87.3 % 72.5 % 80.7 % 98.7 %
Diabetes 27.3 % 51.5 % 72.4 % 61.0 % 59.8 % 56.0 % 100.0 %
HIV Antiretrovirals 64.7 % 82.2 % 84.4 % 100.0 %
Lipid regulators 74.1 % 46.7 % 46.4 % 59.8 % 81.2 % 70.3 % 98.8 %
Nervous system medications 89.1 % 78.2 % 100.0 % 78.2 % 83.3 % 91.4 % 99.5 %
Pain Analgesics 55.0 % 93.2 % 40.6 % 50.0 % 30.8 % 100.0 %
Tuberculosis 40.0 % 59.7 % 30.7 % 46.5 % 50.4 % 61.5 % 80.6 %
Vitamins and Minerals 99.0 % 88.0 % 97.7 % 99.8 % 26.6 %
Note: IMS data. Means over 2015-2017 for all countries except Philippines (2013-2016). Private sector only for Kerala
and Senegal.
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C.3 Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table 14: Average price of molecules present in all countries
All
molecule Kerala Philippines Senegal Serbia SouthAfrica Tunisia Zambia Total
AMOXICILLIN—CLAVULANIC ACID 13.64 0.38 4.44 0.32 3.67 0.48 0.23 3.25
BISOPROLOL 4.23 0.50 4.61 0.06 2.73 0.09 0.07 1.46
CIPROFLOXACIN 3.27 0.22 3.28 0.26 0.80 0.18 1.50 1.05
DICLOFENAC 1.45 0.36 2.21 0.07 0.55 0.05 0.10 0.54
ENALAPRIL 4.84 0.26 4.41 0.06 1.96 0.16 0.81 1.48
METFORMIN 1.47 0.11 1.26 0.03 3.32 0.04 0.03 0.86
OMEPRAZOLE 2.24 2.34 4.65 0.23 4.49 0.42 0.04 1.78
SALBUTAMOL 0.43 0.12 2.91 0.03 1.28 0.01 0.01 0.48
SIMVASTATIN 8.37 0.39 7.66 0.06 1.02 0.18 0.15 2.05
Total 4.44 0.53 3.94 0.13 2.07 0.18 0.33 1.43
Private
molecule Kerala Philippines Senegal Serbia SouthAfrica Tunisia Zambia Total
AMOXICILLIN—CLAVULANIC ACID 13.64 0.36 4.44 0.29 3.90 0.48 0.23 4.30
BISOPROLOL 4.23 0.50 4.61 0.07 3.62 0.19 0.07 1.87
CIPROFLOXACIN 3.27 0.25 3.28 0.25 1.61 0.25 1.50 1.48
DICLOFENAC 1.45 0.36 2.21 0.07 1.29 0.08 0.20 0.78
ENALAPRIL 4.84 0.28 4.41 0.06 2.73 0.29 2.40 2.08
METFORMIN 1.47 0.14 1.26 0.03 3.54 0.07 0.88
OMEPRAZOLE 2.24 2.60 4.65 0.17 9.51 0.66 0.05 2.28
SALBUTAMOL 0.43 0.11 2.91 0.02 1.79 0.01 0.57
SIMVASTATIN 8.37 0.43 7.66 0.07 2.15 0.34 0.20 3.04
Total 4.44 0.56 3.94 0.12 3.35 0.26 0.56 1.95
Public decentralized
molecule Philippines SouthAfrica Total
AMOXICILLIN—CLAVULANIC ACID 0.41 0.41
BISOPROLOL 0.52 1.84 1.18
CIPROFLOXACIN 0.17 0.17
DICLOFENAC 0.35 0.35
ENALAPRIL 0.22 0.22
METFORMIN 0.09 0.09
OMEPRAZOLE 1.99 1.99
SALBUTAMOL 0.14 0.14
SIMVASTATIN 0.30 0.30
Total 0.53 1.84 0.64
Public centralized
molecule Philippines Serbia SouthAfrica Tunisia Zambia Total
AMOXICILLIN—CLAVULANIC ACID 0.37 3.44 0.47 1.16
BISOPROLOL 0.04 0.00 0.03
CIPROFLOXACIN 0.21 0.27 0.40 0.12 0.29
DICLOFENAC 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.10
ENALAPRIL 0.06 1.57 0.03 0.02 0.55
METFORMIN 0.06 0.03 3.21 0.02 0.03 0.94
OMEPRAZOLE 0.32 1.14 0.18 0.01 0.51
SALBUTAMOL 0.03 1.03 0.01 0.01 0.36
SIMVASTATIN 0.06 0.46 0.02 0.04 0.19
Total 0.11 0.14 1.30 0.10 0.02 0.47
Note: Price in US$ by Std Unit.
D Effects on Average Molecule Price
We study the effect of procurement systems on average price using the following regression model:
log(picst) = αic + γa(i) + λs + icst (6)
where i is the molecule, c the country, s the sector in the country (Private, Public centralized or
Public decentralized) and t is the year.
The results in Table 15 are in line with the product-level ones discussed in Section 5. Cen-
tralized procurement allows the public sector to obtain prices that are between 41 and 58% lower
(compare with 40 and 44% lower prices when using product-level data).
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Table 15: Regressions at Molecule Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Generic available -3.4492*** -1.3099*** -0.3024 -0.1199
(0.1921) (0.1782) (0.3326) (0.2203)
Public decentralized 0.5149* -0.4662** -0.2943* -0.1621
(0.2252) (0.1743) (0.1386) (0.0953)
Public centralized -0.4817** -0.4135*** -0.5017*** -0.5824***
(0.1500) (0.1140) (0.0888) (0.0605)
Serbia 0.1884 -0.2746 -0.5480*** 8.0941***
(0.2067) (0.1573) (0.1291) (0.4742)
SouthAfrica 2.3908*** 2.0839*** 1.7731*** 3.6111***
(0.2309) (0.1756) (0.1367) (0.5379)
Tunisia 0.0976 -0.1485 -0.2723 2.4119***
(0.2488) (0.1903) (0.1539) (0.5411)
Kerala 2.9966*** 2.9796*** 2.6495*** 6.8293***
(0.2333) (0.1802) (0.1407) (0.4793)
Zambia -0.5069 -0.6886** -0.8262*** -0.7936
(0.3047) (0.2315) (0.1792) (0.7859)
Senegal 2.0655*** 1.9355*** 1.6723*** 1.8022*
(0.2945) (0.2232) (0.1721) (0.7837)
N 1070 1070 1070 1070
Area fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Molecule*country fixed effects No No No Yes
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Are the differences in prices across sectors due to the differences of the demand shape of
those sectors? As shown in table 16, the demand elasticity computed at the molecule level again
appears to be lower for the centralized procurement channel.
log(yicst) = αic + γa(i) + λs + β log(picst) + icst (7)
where yicst is the aggregate demand of molecule i in country c, sector s and year t.
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Table 16: Reduced Form Demand at molecule level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(price molecule) -0.8692*** -0.8869***
(0.0620) (0.0792)
log price * Private -0.8250*** -0.6561*** -2.2836**
(0.0889) (0.1307) (0.7777)
log price * Public decentralized -0.9108*** -0.7729*** -3.0830***
(0.1675) (0.1962) (0.9116)
log price * Public centralized -0.9479*** -1.0581*** -1.3681*
(0.0892) (0.1285) (0.5862)
Generic available -0.4212 -0.0622 -0.0546 0.0795 -0.0955
(0.3661) (0.8426) (0.8426) (0.8043) (0.8551)
Public decentralized -1.0246** -0.9188** -0.9126** -0.7993* -1.0045*
(0.3503) (0.3518) (0.3530) (0.3492) (0.3985)
Public centralized -0.0883 -0.0660 -0.1318 -0.5309* -0.1057
(0.2298) (0.2283) (0.2322) (0.2411) (0.4670)
N 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070
Area fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule*country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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